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HI. REFERENCES AND CITATIONS 
References and citations in this brief shall have the following abbreviations: 
The record of court* s file on appeal - AR (Appellate Record) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure - URCP, and 
Utah Code Annotated- UCA 
Exhibits —Ex 
Citations to the record will be (AR ) 
IV. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Wardley Corporation, hereinafter "Wardley", argues that Young is bound by the Agency 
Agreement1 which she entered into with it. Indeed, also is Wardley, and Wardley is bound by the 
statute and laws of the State regulating the conduct of real estate brokers, as well as the case law of 
Utah construing those statutes. The Real Estate Code2 provides that real estate agents cannot 
maintain a suit in the Utah courts to recover their commission except against the principal broker with 
whom they are licensed to engage in the business. In this case, appellant, Cindy Young, hereinafter 
"Young," was entirely dependant upon Wardley to collect her earned real estate commission. This 
placed upon Wardley a heightened duty of agency and a fiduciary duty to use all diligence to 
safeguard and collect Young* s earned real estate commission for the sale of the Chateau Brickyard 
Retirement Apartments, hereinafter "Chateau" or "Brickyard". For this reason the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah held that a real estate agency agreement between a broker and a real estate agent 
was in actuality an employment agreement. Contrary to the summary judgement of the trial court, 
this raises a substantial dispute as to an issue of material fact as to whether Wardley did all that it 
1
 The Agency Agreement is titled Broker-Sales Executive Contract Independent 
Contractor Agreement. 
2
 § 61-2-18 
reasonably could have done to discharge this duty to Young which precluded the granting of 
summary judgment. 
Further, as construed by the Court, the Agency/Employment Agreement is ambiguous, which 
requires the taking of extrinsic evidence to determine 1) whether it is ambiguous and 2) if so, the 
intention of the parties at the time of entering into the Agreement. 
ARGUMENT 
A. POINTS REGARDING APPELLEE'S FACT STATEMENT 
Appellee sets forth a number of fact statements from the Agency/Employment Agreement 
between Young and Wardley that are incorrect or are largely irrelevant and are not applicable to the 
facts of this case. 
1. Chief among these are extractions of statements from paragraph 9 of the Agreement, 
which is not applicable at all to the Young v. Wardley issues. Paragraph 9 of the Employment 
Agreement applies specifically to disputes between two or more agents who have overlapping or 
conflicting claims to commissions and not to whether or not Wardley failed to pay them a commission 
at all. The statement that, "In no case shall Wardley be liable to sales executive (agent) for any 
commission..." is taken out of context from that paragraph and does not apply to the facts of this case 
at all. Wardley has already made this same argument below regarding paragraph 9. The trial court 
ruled that paragraph 9 was not applicable to Young's case and based it's ruling on paragraph 8 of the 
Agreement. Wardley has not appealed that ruling. 
2. In Wardley's fact statement paragraph 2(d) Wardley quotes out of context part of 
paragraph 16 of the Agreement. Paragraph 16 merely provides that should an agent terminate his or 
her relationship as an agent with Wardley the agent shall not be entitled to any commission unless the 
2 
transaction has closed and the commission is paid to Wardley before the termination of the agent. 
In other words, that paragraph waives any obligation on the part of Wardley to pay commissions for 
services rendered by the agent if the transaction does not close and the seller does not pay the 
commission before the termination date of the agent. That provision is wholly inapplicable to the 
issues in this appeal. The sale of the Chateau closed in July 1996 and Young* s agency relationship 
with Wardley was not terminated until 1999. (AR 1396, p.529) 
3. Wardley states as a matter of fact in its fact statement no. 3 that Wardley paid Young 
80 % of each commission. Wardley cites Young* s Amended Complaint which alleges that at times 
material to the complaint Young was entitled to receive an 80% share of the commissions paid and 
was paid 80% of some commissions. The entire tenor and allegations of the Amended Complaint 
make it clear that Wardley did not pay Young 80% of the commissions paid on the Chateau 
transaction. That was the subject of the trial below wherein the jury awarded Young $46,000.00. 
(AR 1198-1200) Wardley initially filed an appeal of that verdict and judgment but later dropped the 
appeal. (AR 1292-1294: Record of case on appeal) 
4. Wardley admits in its fact statement no. 7 that young protested the unilateral reduction 
of the real estate commission at closing, but states that she did nothing more to protect herself or 
Wardley by preventing the escrow agent from paying the unpaid portion of commissions to the seller 
and the buyer. Young did instruct the escrow agent not to disburse the unpaid portion, but did not 
have authority to compel the escrow agent not to. (AR 312-313, Young's affidavit in opposition to 
Wardley* s summary judgment motion) Only Wardley through one of its officers could make that 
demand. Furthermore, details of the closing had little relevance at trial because of the issuance of 
summary judgment. The issue at trial was whether Wardley had paid Young her share of the 
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commissions it did receive at the time of closing ($ 150,000). The evidence at trial was that it had not, 
and the jvffy brought back a special verdict awarding $46,000 to Young. (AR 1223-1224) 
5, Wardley states in its fact statement no. 9 that Young provided no expert testimony to 
support her claim that Wardley's efforts to collect the commission shortfall was unreasonable or 
otherwise deficient. In her affidavit, Young provided testimony that she did consult attorneys about 
what could and should be done to collect the unpaid commission. (AR 313-316) She also submitted 
as exhibits to her affidavit in opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment, letters from 
Wardley* s own attorneys, John Mangum of the law firm of Nielsen & Senior and Dan Anderson of 
the law firm of Fabian Clendennen, opining that Wardley had an action against the escrow agent and 
the buyer, as well as the seller. (AR 371-376: 382-387) 
B. WARDLEY IS BOUND BY THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT IT SIGNED 
AND YOUNG IS ENTITLED TO HAVE IT ENFORCED ACCORDING 
TO THE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES AT THE TIME OF SIGNING. 
Young does not quarrel with the law as stated by Wardley in its brief relative to contract 
construction as far as it goes. "The underlying purpose in construing or interpreting a contract is to 
ascertain the intentions of the parties to the contract/5 WebBankv. American General Annuity Serv. 
Corp., 54 P.3d 1139,1144,454 Utah Adv. Rep. 48 (Utah 2002) citing Peterson v. Coca-Cola, 2002 
UT42, f 9, 48P.3d941: and SAdE Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Assoc. Inc., 
2001 UT 5e4, f 14, 28 P. 3d 669. " 'In interpreting a contract, the intentions of the parties are 
controlling.>w (Id ) (quoting Dixon v. Pro Image, Inc., 1999 UT 89, 957 P.3d 48) (Other citations 
omitted) 
The courts look to the language of the writing itself to ascertain the parities' intentions and 
consider each contract provision in relation to all of the others, with a view to giving effect, "Ho all 
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and ignoring none."* (Id) (citations and quotations omitted) Normally, if the language is clear and 
unambiguous a contract is construed by the language within the four corners of the contract. 
However, if there is any ambiguity in its terms, the trial court must take extrinsic evidence to 
determine whether or not it is ambiguous and if so to determine the intention of the parties at the time 
they entered into the contract. (Id.); Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Association, 907 P.2d 264 
(1995) and Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923, 928 (Utah 1998). Whether the contract is ambiguous 
is a question of law and is reviewed for correctness. (Id) A contract is ambiguous if it may be 
subject to two or more plausible or reasonable interpretations because of "uncertain meanings of 
terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies/* (Id); WebBank, 54 P.3d @ 1145, ^  20. The Utah 
Supreme Court has also, "extended the ambiguity in contracts to include instances where despite the 
lack of ambiguity in the terms and provisions of the contract themselves, an ambiguity exits as to the 
nature and character of the contract or transaction as a whole/* (Id 1f 21) 
Wardley argues that there are at least four provisions that "confirm the parties' intent that 
Young's receipt of her net commission was dependent upon Wardley's receipt of the gross 
commission proceeds from the underlying transaction." Wardley seizes upon the use of the word 
or expression "received" in those four provisions to argue the Employment Agreement clearly 
indicates that Wardley intended and is only required to pay Young a commission on the amount of 
the money it received as commission from the seller. This passive position is precisely the course of 
conduct that Wardley undertook. Wardley merely sat back at the time of the closing of the Chateau 
and allowed the seller to pay what it wanted to pay as a commission without taking any steps to 
protect and secure the full amount that the seller contracted to pay in the Listing Agreement. 
Contrary to the contention of Wardley, the Agreement between it and Young is not clear that 
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the payment of Young's earned commission for both the purchase and the sale of the Chateau is 
dependent solely upon the amount that it received from the seller at closing. First of all, there is no 
provision in the Agreement that states specifically and plainly that Young would not be paid a 
commission if it were not collected or received by Wardley. There is not an express provision that 
requires Young to waive her commission if the commission is not collected from the seller because 
of Wardley's inaction or reluctance to take steps necessary to protect all the earned commissions at 
closing, or to exhaust legal means to obtain the commission from culpable parties after the closing. 
There is no express provision in the Agreement that Wardley can arbitrarily waive or compromise 
Young's commission, hi Reed v. Union Cent Life Ins., 61 P. 21(Utah 1900); andih the Matter of 
the Estate ofAlmon J. Flake, 71 P3d 589 (Utah 2003), the Court held that "a waiver is an intentional 
relinquishment of a known right." Waiver also requires a specific intention to relinquish it. 
Furthermore, "The court will not rewrite a contract to supply terms which the parties omitted." Hal 
Taylor Assoc, v. Unionamerica, Inc. 657 P.2d 743,749 (Utah 1982) Courts are not obligated rewrite 
contracts to relieve one party from a bargain later regretted. Webb v. R O.A. General, Inc., 804 P.2d 
547, 541 (Utah App. 1991). 
A close examination of each of the terms or provisions of the Agreement indicate the use 
of the words "received" and "collected" are only employed in the context of explaining how or when 
the commissions under differing conditions were to be apportioned between agents and between 
agents and Wardley as the broker. There is nothing in those provisions of the Agreement that states 
directly that the agent is only entitled to be paid the commissions only if, only when, or not until they 
6 
are received (in other words, collected) by Wardley.3 
The use of the word "received** in the "In-House Commission** provision on page 4 of the 
Agreement uses the word and expression "received** or "collected** in the context of explaining how 
and when the commissions are to be apportioned and paid out to the respective agent(s). 
Wardley argues that paragraph 8 of the Agreement provides that Young will receive her 
commission based only upon the amount 'collected** by Wardley. However, the use of the word and 
expression "collection** in that provision is clearly and plainly for the purpose of providing when the 
commission will be paid and not for limiting the amount of the commission paid or to be paid. It is 
plain that the provision protects the agent from unnecessary delays by the broker in paying the agent 
their commissions. Contrary to Wardley* s argument that the word "collection** limits the commission 
to the amount collected, that same provision expresses the commission in terms of the "[D]ivsion and 
distribution of "earned commissions.** Young* s "earned commission** was determined by the 
percentage of commission provided in the Listing Agreement between Wardley and the seller, which 
is her share of the four percent of the sales price of $7,900,000.00, which amounts to a total 
commission of $316,000.00. 
Wardley accuses Young of arguing in her brief the provision concerning "distribution of 
earned commissions** of paragraph 8 in isolation from the other provisions and terms of the 
Agreement. Paragraph 8, while not expressed in the clearest terms, is plainly the Agreement* s 
primary provision providing for the division and distribution of commissions ("earned commissions.**) 
It is not expressed or incorporated obliquely by reference into the main body of the signed 
3
 The treatment of this issue is more thoroughly discussed in appellanfs opening appeal 
brief pp. 13-17. 
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Agreement It is a primary provision of the Agreement 
WebBank v. American Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, If 18, 54 P.3d 1139, 1144 
(Utah 2002) and PlateauMining Co. V. State Division of Lands, 802 P.2d 720,725 (Utah 1990) are 
not to the contrary. In fact, the Supreme Court reversed the trial courts grant of summary judgment 
in the WebBank case and remanded it to the trial court with specific instructions to determine the 
parties' intentions as to whether the lump sum payment by WebBank in return for an assignment of 
future payments under the structured settlement agreement with American General was in fact a 
secured loan or was a sale and an assignment of the remaining future payments and in violation of the 
structured settlement agreement with American General. And this notwithstanding, there was no 
apparent ambiguity from the face of the documents, promissory note and the security agreement 
prepared by Webbank and signed by the beneficiary of the structured settlement. The Court 
concluded that, u[D]espite the absence of ambiguity in the contract language and provisions 
themselves, we conclude that an ambiguity exists as to the nature or character of the transactions as 
a whole and [B]ecause summary judgment was improper due to the existence of a disputed factual 
issue as to WebBank and Soliz' s intentions and the nature and character of the transaction we reverse 
and remand for trial in order that extrinsic evidence may be presented as to the WebBank's and 
Soliz's intentions regarding the nature and character of the transaction, notwithstanding there was 
no apparent ambiguity from the documents. 
Young agrees that the terms and provisions of the Agreement must be read together. The 
oblique references to 'received' commissions cannot be read in isolation and without the provision 
in paragraph 8 concerning the division and distribution of "earned commissions." Nor can the 
entitlement to commissions be construed in isolation from the amount of the commission which the 
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seller, Chateau, agreed to pay in the Listing Agreement between it and Wardley. The terms and 
provisions must be given their natural meaning in the context of the provision in which they are 
contained. They should not be given some strained meaning which means something other than their 
purpose and use in each respective provision and paragraph. 
Wardley stretches beyond limits the construction of the Agreement when it attempts to argue 
that paragraph 9 provides that "in no case" is Young entitled to any commission until it is collected, 
and announces in triumphant tones that paragraph 9 fortifies that "Wardley* s actual receipt of the 
gross commission from the seller is the sine qua non of its duty to pay Young's net commission."4 
Paragraph 9 applies only to disputed commissions between agents who make overlapping claims to 
commissions. The paragraph provides that Wardley will hold the commissions due to the agents 
(sales executives) until the portions are mutually agreed upon by the agents or determined by 
arbitration and then pay them to the agents out of the agents' portion of the total commissions) 
when it is collected. It provides that in no case shall Wardley be obligated to pay the agents any of 
the disputed commissions which are to come out of their share of the commissions. That language 
is distinctively different from the fact and issues between Wardley and Young in this case. In this case 
the dispute is between the broker, Wardley, and Young as agent, which is controlled by the provisions 
of paragraph 8 of the Agreement. 
C CONTRARY TO WARDLEY'S CONTENTION, CASE AUTHORITIES 
ARE ON POINT AND APPLICABLE TO THE ISSUE. 
In absence of any specific primary or other provision that clearly states an agent (Young) may 
4
 Wardley made the same argument with regard to paragraph 9 below (AR 755, 758) and 
the trial court rejected paragraph 9 as having any relevance to the issue before the Court. The 
Honorable Judge based her decision on paragraph 8 and on the " In House Commission" 
provision on page 4 of the Agreement. ( AR 800-801) 
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only be paid a commission if Wardley happens to collect it, Wardley has seized upon the various 
provisions of the Agreement explaining when and how the commissions will be distributed and 
ignores or misconstrues the provision in paragraph 8 concerning the division and distribution of 
"earned commissions" to fashion its argument that it owes Young no commission that it does not 
collect. It ascribes to itself to be the sole judge under the Agreement as to what action it will take 
to collect the commission. 
As construed by Wardley and the trial court below, the Agreement is ambiguous and extrinsic 
evidence of the circumstances surrounding the entering into the Agreement must be taken to 
determine if it is ambiguous. Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Association^! P.2d 264. If the 
Agreement is ambiguous, if it is subject to two or more plausible interpretations, extrinsic evidence 
must be taken to determine the intent of the parties at the time they entered into the Agreement.. 
IX THE CASES CITED BY YOUNG ARISE OUT OF THE 
APPIICATTON OF UTAH INSURANCE LAW WHICH IS VERY 
SIMILAR TO REAL ESTATE LAW. 
Wardley criticizes and ridicules the authorities cited by Young in support of her arguments 
in her appeal brie£ claiming that Young is attempting to rewrite the agreement between herself and 
Wardley based upon authorities which do not deal directly with contract disputes between real estate 
brokers and their agents. Wardley characterizes this as attempting to trump express covenants by 
citing authorities that interpret entirely different cases and different contract language. By this 
characterization of the issues and the cases, Wardley is attempting to skate by real estate law that 
places the primary responsibility for collecting commissions upon the principal broker and places a 
high contractual and agency duty on that broker to protect and secure commissions that the agents, 
in this case Young, have earned by sweaty, tireless efforts and outstanding representation. 
10 
Wardley argues that the cases cited are about different contracts, the Agency listing agreement 
between the seller and the broker and not the employment (agency) agreement between Wardley and 
Young. Wardley either fails to recognize or chooses to ignore the fact that the listing agreement must 
be read along with the Agreement between Wardley and Young to determine the amount of 
commission to which both Wardley and Young were entitled. Fairbourne Commercial, Inc., v. 
American Housing Partners, Inc., 68 P.3d 1038, 2003 UT App. 98 (Utah App. 2003); Robert 
Langston, Ltd, v. McQuarrie, 741 P.2d 554, 558 ( Utah App. 1987), Rehearing denied These 
cases held that a broker is entitled to a commission by producing a ready, willing and able purchaser, 
whether or not the sale is consummated. This also applies to Young as an agent for a broker, in this 
case Wardley, and is foundational to Young* s claim. If she is not entitled to the commission in the 
first instance, (for finding a ready, willing and able buyer), she has no standing to claim against 
Wardley for her share of the earned commission. If Wardley is entitled to a commission then Young 
is also. 
Furthermore, the holding that the broker does not guarantee payment of the commission by 
a third party applies in this case. The agent, Young in this case, doesn't guarantee payment either. 
Cannon v. Stevens School of Business, Inc, 560 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1977) mdReedv. Union Cent Life 
Ins. Co., 61 P. 21 (Utah 1900) hold that an employer or a contracting company cannot put receipt 
of a commission beyond their reach voluntarily and escape liability for the payment of the commission 
to the agent or employee. Bushnell Real Estate, Inc. v. Nielson, 672 P. 2d 746, 750 (Utah 1983) is 
a real estate case in which the buyer defaulted on a note to pay off the purchase price and the seller 
stopped making payments to the broker. The Utah Supreme Court held that the broker nevertheless 
was entitled to the fiill commission. Young is in a very similar position here. There is a disputed issue 
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of fact in this case as to whether Wardley's failure to pursue collection of the unpaid portion of the 
commission is just that, a voluntary relinquishment of the unpaid commission. 
Abraham v. Walter Neller Company, 172 N. W. 2d 817 (Michigan 1969) while not 
controlling is very persuasive. Its factual issues are identical or nearly identical to the instant case, 
the Abraham case involved both the enforcement of a listing agreement and an agency agreement 
with a sales agent. The Michigan Supreme Court construed a provision in the agency agreement 
contract which provided for the payment of u[a] commission in accordance with the rate schedule 
below, [I]mmediately afer the consummation of any sale as soon as such commission has been 
collected by the broker." The broker took a listing agreement with one reservation and chose not to 
charge or collect a commission. The Michigan Court held that the phrase, "immediately after the 
consummation of any sale as soon as the commission has been collected by the broker"', specified the 
time when the broker was required to pay the earned commission, but did not allow the broker to 
deny the agent his earned commission by the broker's either failing to collect the commission or 
accepting a listing agreement contrary to the agency contract. 
While not controlling, the case is very much like the one at bar and the holding is very 
applicable to the facts of this case. Wardley quips in its fact statement and in its argument that Young 
did little or nothing to secure and protect the commissions at the time of closing. Young did all she 
could do. She protested a reduction of the commissions to the buyer, the seller, the escrow agent and 
her immediate broker, Kenneth Tramp, who was Wardley's branch broker over Young. Wardley, 
on the other hand, who had the legal authority to commence an interpleader action and obtain a stay, 
did nothing to stop the disbursement of the $166,000 to the seller and the buyer, and of which was 
in violation of the Listing Agreement. Wardley's later suit against the seller was too little too late. 
12 
Wardley's failure to take action against the buyer and the escrow agent was contrary to the advice 
and counsel of its own attorney, John Mangum, who wrote both the buyer and the title company and 
placed them on notice that if Wardley did not recover the full amount of commission from the seller 
it would seek recovery from them. (AR 381-388) Wardley's attempt to place its burden and 
responsibility on Young is bold, garish and disingenuous in light of the facts of this case. 
The trial judge's construction and holding that Young's "earned commission" is governed by 
the "as soon as practical afer collection" language in paragraph 8 of the Agreement and the "In House 
Commission" provision on page 4 of the Agreement (AR 799-801) is in error and should be reversed. 
Also, like the holding in WebBankv. American GeneralAnnuity Serv. Corp., Supra, 54 P.3d at 1144, 
there is a genuine dispute as to a material issue of fact as to the nature and character of the contract 
and transaction as well that precludes summary judgment. The case should be remanded to take 
extrinsic evidence regarding the conduct of Wardley at the closing, and later in connection with its 
failure to take action against the buyer and the escrow agent. 
E. THERE ARE DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT THAT 
NEED TO BE ADJUDICATED. 
Wardley argues that there are no disputed issues of material fact that need to be adjudicated. 
To the contrary, that is what this appeal is all about. There are substantial disputed issues of material 
fact that need to be adjudicated by the trial court, in addition to taking extrinsic evidence to resolve 
ambiguities in the construction of the Agreement between Wardley and Young. Chief among the 
disputed issues of fact is whether Wardley lived up to its duty under the Agreement to protect and 
secure the payment of all of the earned commission in the sale and purchase transaction of the 
Chateau. The Supreme Court in WebBank remanded the case back to the trial court to determine 
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from extrinsic evidence the intentions of the parties to the contract. It determined in that case that 
because of the nature and character of the case, and the surrounding circumstances, that the contracts, 
though facially unambiguous, were nevertheless ambiguous and required the taking of parol evidence 
to clear up the intentions of the parties. 
The case at bar has similar characteristics. The trial court granted summary judgment based 
upon what it described as the plain language of the contract. Presumably because the use of the 
words or expressions "received" and "collected" are verbs and usually mean the possession of 
something as being received or obtained, the trial judge felt that those words or expressions meant 
that unless the commissions were received or collected, Wardley was under no obligation to pay 
Young any part of the uncollected commission. However, this wholly overlooks two important 
factors. First, when the words or expression are viewed in the context in which they were used, they 
were not employed specifically to indicate receipt or collection. They were part of a provision of 
expression used to describe how and when the commissions were to be apportioned and paid to 
Wardley* s agent. Second, it completely overlooks the duties that Wardley has to Young as an agent. 
It overlooks the roll that Wardley necessarily has as the principal broker in the transaction to collect 
the commissions and not just passively sit by while the seller and the buyer, together with the escrow 
agent, dissipate the sales proceeds that were designated in the closing documents (HUDs) as 
commission to the broker. Young did her best to protest any reduction in the commissions and 
disbursement to the parties. Wardley did not agree to any reduction, but only Wardley could take 
legal steps to have the escrow agent interplead and thereby safeguard the funds. There is a serious 
dispute in this case as to whether Wardley adequately discharged that duty and the matter needs to 
be remanded to the trial court to take evidence on that issue; evidence that Young was precluded 
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from adducing at the trial because of the granting of Wardley's motion for summary judgment. 
This issue also goes to the issue of whether Wardley violated a covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing by its conduct or its failing to act. Where there is a contract there is always an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corporation, 94 P.3d 193,197-
198 (Utah 2004); see also SterlingB. Cannon v. Stevens School of Business, 560 P.2d 1383,1385, 
Supra, The trial judge on the first summary judgment motion dismissed Young's claim for breach 
of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing, opining that under the language of the agreement, 
Wardley did not have to do more. This Court should also reverse the granting of summary judgment 
dismissing Young's claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
Wardley argues on pages 16 & 17 of its response brief that the arguments on pages 8 and 9 
of Young's brief are not material because, 1) paragraphs 11 and 13 of the Agreement conferred on 
Wardley the sole ownership of the listing and exclusive discretion to decide whether and to what 
extent to pursue collection of any claimed commission, 2) Wardley undertook significant efforts to 
collect the disputed commission from the seller, and 3) Young failed to adduce any expert testimony 
that Wardley's collection efforts were deficient. 
Young acknowledges that Wardley was the sole owner of the listing agreement and had the 
right to determine what efforts it would take to collect unpaid commissions. However, these 
provisions do not provide Wardley a waiver of responsibility for failing to discharge its duty as a 
broker to safeguard and collect earned commissions onbehalf of the agents employed by it. Wardley 
does not wish to discuss its failure to safeguard and protect the sales proceeds sufficient to collect 
the full commissions while the funds were in escrow. Indeed, instead it attempts to put that burden 
on Young's shoulders. Wardley did nothing except to refuse to agree to a reduction in the earned 
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commission. 
Wardley trumpets its suing the seller and obtaining a default judgment as significant efforts 
to collect commission. In reality, all it did was have its attorney file a complaint and have it served 
upon the seller. There was no other prosecution of the case except to file for and obtain a default 
judgment when the seller failed to answer the complaint. Wardley had a law firm in California do an 
asset search which revealed the seller had no net assets, which also revealed why the seller did not 
answer Wardley* s complaint. This can hardly be described as significant efforts. In reality, it was too 
little too late! Wardley did not pursue anything further against the seller and did not pursue litigation 
against other culpable parties such as the buyer and the escrow agent, notwithstanding the advice of 
its own attorney, John Mangum. Wardley had a clear case of interference with contractual relations 
against the buyer who now had the Chateau property which he purchased for $7,900,000.00, less the 
$75,000.00 he pilfered out of Wardley's commission along with the seller who absconded with 
$91,000.00, because Wardley did nothing to stop them. Young was present at the buyer's closing 
while he telephoned the seller from the title company's office. Young heard the buyer, Gary Taylor, 
tell the seller over the telephone that they could take the money out of Young's commission (AR 
626). Taylor knew that Wardley had a contract with the seller as well as with him as the buyer, 
because Young disclosed it in a limited agency agreement. He also knew the amount of the 
commission Wardley was to receive because it was disclosed in the settlement documents (HUDs) 
at his closing. 
After such a shoddy attempt to collect the unpaid commission from the seller after the closing, 
Wardley has the unmitigated audacity to argue in its brief that Young failed to do anything at closing 
to secure and safeguard the full commission. In fact, Young protested any change in Wardley's 
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commission to the buyer, the seller and escrow agent, and immediately told Kenneth Tramp, her 
supervisor and Wardley* s broker in the branch office where Young worked, that the seller and the 
buyer were trying to make off with some of the commission. (AR 626) Following the closing, Young 
continued to query Tramp about what Wardley was doing until Wardley commenced the action 
against the seller. Young also contacted Wardley* s attorney, John Mangum, and an attorney from 
the firm of Fabian Clendenin, Dan Anderson. Both Mangum and Anderson advised Wardley that it 
had a cause of action against the escrow agent and the buyer, as well as one against the seller. (AR 
639-646) It is clear from these pages, that it was not Wardley, but Young that was spurring the 
collection efforts during and after the closing. 
As for Wardley's snide argument that Young failed to adduce any expert testimony that it's 
collection efforts did not meet some standard, this was a summary judgment motion or motions of 
Wardley. The status and posture of the case did not call for Young to adduce expert testimony as 
to the inadequacy of Wardley* s collection efforts. The letters of the two attorneys set forth above 
were expert testimony as to what was available to Wardley. The court was obligated to construe 
the evidence put forth in Young* favor and to draw all reasonable inferences therefrom. The court 
could and should have drawn a reasonable inference that had it tried the issues at an evidentiary 
hearing, Young could and would have adduced expert testimony to meet any such requirement. 
V. YOUNG HAS ESTABLISHED THROUGHOUT HER BRIEF 
HOW THE AGENCY AGREEMENT IS AMBIGUOUS, AS 
WELL AS THE EXISTENCE OF DISPUTED ISSUES OF FACT 
Lastly, Wardley argues that Young's final argument in her opening brief is fatally deficient, 
because in that argument Young does not specify any phrase or word by which the Agreement is 
conditionally ambiguous. Wardley's characterization is more poetic than accurate. Earlier in her brief, 
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Young identified in detail the words and phrases which are ambiguous. They are the words and 
phrases in the provisions which the Court construes to hold that Wardley is not obligated to pay a 
commission unless it is received or collected (Opening brief, pp. 13-17). Young's final argument is 
summary in nature and is supported by the arguments contained to that point in the opening brief. 
VL CONCLUSION 
The primary basis for this appeal is that Wardley did not discharge its duty under the contract 
to collect or safeguard all of Young's earned commission on the sale of the Chateau Brickyard 
Retirement Apartments. One would think that Wardley would have been oveijoyed at the closing of 
such a substantial and lucrative purchase and sale, one in which Young located both the buyer and 
the seller and worked tirelessly for many months before it was closed. However, be that as it may, 
Young's opening brief and this reply explain in detail the error of the Court in construing words and 
phrases according to their common meaning alone, and in contravention and out of the context in 
which they were used. Young's construction is both plausible and reasonable and takes into 
consideration the sense and meaning they are given in the context in which they were used; to simply 
describe how the commission was to be apportioned and when it was to be paid. The parties put 
forth at least two plausible and reasonable interpretations. 
There is considerable cogent information to establish a disputed issue of fact as to whether 
Wardley discharged its duty to safeguard and collect the full earned commission in the Chateau sale. 
This Court is required to construe the evidence submitted in the affidavits, depositions and other 
discovery and all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to Young as the opposing party. This 
Court should reverse the two orders of summary judgment issued by the trial court and remand this 
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action for trial to determine the intention andcgnduct of the parties from the evidence. 
Respectfully submitted this yf day of October: 
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foregoing Reply Brief of the appellant in the United States Mail, first class postage prepaid addressed 
to: 
ANDERSON AND KARENBERG 
JOHN T.ANDERSON 
700 Chase Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2006 
19 
